What will change, what won’t, and what remains unknown
The current predicament has roots from the past century. When the Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946 (after the two sides briefly allied to oppose Japan), the United States supported the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石 Jiǎng Jièshí) over Máo Zédōng’s 毛泽东 communists. By 1949, Chiang and the Republic of China government had fled to Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China was established on the mainland. Both governments claimed jurisdiction over all of China.
The United States, fearing the spread of communism across Asia, supported the claims of Taiwan, which, while not democratic at the time, at least was not communist. By the 1970s, the ground had started to shift. The PRC took over the China seat at the United Nations from the Republic of China in 1971. Both sides initially nixed the concept of dual recognition, which would go against the concept each supported of a single China. (Since the 1990s, there have been initiatives for Taiwan to separately join the UN, but Taiwan is still blocked by China from joining the UN and other international organizations, making Craft’s conversation with Tsai especially symbolic.)
In 1979, after years of careful negotiation, the United States switched diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Congress swiftly responded with the Taiwan Relations Act, which codified American support for Taiwan. That legislation, along with what came to be known as the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, form the backbone of U.S. relations with China and Taiwan, allowing for unofficial ties to Taiwan while acknowledging the concept of a single China.
Those understandings have maintained a sometimes uneasy cross-strait peace for decades, though they have led to some unconventional accommodations. The Taiwan Relations Act called for the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation established to carry out embassy-like functions in Taiwan (disclosure: I interned at AIT in 2019). The head of the institute is referred to as its director, rather than ambassador. When Taiwanese officials visited the United States, they met with government officials in hotels or other unofficial spaces rather than government offices.
“Lifting the internal guidelines is more than just symbolic,” says Lewis. “For example, the move opens the door to change which representatives of the Taiwan and U.S. governments meet and where they meet. Whether it will lead to a sustained increase in senior-level meetings will only be known as the Biden administration’s Taiwan policy takes shape.”
“Eliminating the guidelines does not mandate any changes,” adds David Keegan, who served as a foreign service officer in the State Department for 30 years was the deputy director of AIT…
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